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Duration of Equity Overvaluation and Managers’ Choice to Use Aggressive 
Underlying Earnings Disclosure and Accrual-based earnings Management: 
Australian Evidence 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether equity overvaluation duration influences managers’ 
choice of different earnings management mechanisms and how corporate governance 
and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission’s underlying earnings 
disclosure guidelines influence managers’ choices. The study samples Australian 
Securities Exchange 200 firms from 2009–2016. Findings show that on average, firms 
more likely engage in accrual-based earnings management in the early overvaluation 
stage. In later stages, firms more likely disclose underlying earnings aggressively to 
sustain overvaluation. Additionally, firms with a high proportion of independent 
directors on the board prefer to disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain 
the equity overvaluation; firms with a low proportion of independent directors prefer 
both accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure to sustain the overvaluation. Moreover, firms that conform to the 
Commission’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines use neither accrual-based 
earnings management nor aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain 
overvaluation, but non-conforming firms use both mechanisms. 
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Key words: underlying earnings disclosure, accrual-based earnings management, 






Because earnings and their growth are key components determining firm value, 
managers are highly motivated to increase earnings and their growth expectations, 
ultimately inflating firm value to increase stock prices (Adams et al.,  2009; 
Badertscher, 2011; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham et al., 2005). Evidence shows 
that managers’ wealth increases as a firm’s stock price increases, because their 
compensation is associated with the stock price via stock performance-based 
incentives (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Moreover, managers’ job security in 
the executive labour market typically increases with strong performance of the firm’s 
stock, with a manager being less likely to lose a job when the stock is performing well 
(Jensen, 2005). These motivations typically stimulate managers to strive for higher 
stock prices. Studies have found that managers are fully aware of opportunities to 
manage earnings, and earnings management is the main approach used by managers 
to obtain their desired economic outcomes because investors are unlikely to uncover 
earnings management (Badertscher, 2011; Nelson et al., 2002, 2003; Xie, 2001). 
However, the aggregate shareholder value destroyed by earnings management far 
exceeds that of high-profile fraud cases (Badertscher, 2011; Graham et al., 2005). 
Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity suggests that when a firm’s stock 
price becomes overvalued, the firm maintains the overvaluation by participating in a 
variety of earnings management choices. Previous research has provided empirical 
evidence consistent with Jensen’s (2005) conjecture. For instance, Efendi et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that firms exhibiting signs of overvaluation in the years prior to 
engaging in non-statutory earnings management increase managers’ stock 
compensation incentives to sustain the overvalued stock prices. Badertscher (2011) 
indicated that overvaluation is an important determinant of earnings management 
decisions. This author found that managers participate in accrual-based earnings 
management in the early stage of overvaluation, then move to real activities earnings 
management to sustain the overvaluation of the equity; in the later stages, managers 
tend to engage in non-generally accepted accounting principle (non-GAAP) earnings 
management. Although several studies have investigated the correlation between 
overvaluation of equity and earnings management, there remains limited empirical 
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evidence for the correlation between the duration of overvaluation and management’s 
choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms (Badertscher, 2011). 
This paper initially examines whether the duration of overvaluation affects managers’ 
decisions to use different earnings management mechanisms. It investigates whether 
the duration of equity overvaluation affects managers’ choice to use accrual-based 
earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. The results 
demonstrate that, on average, in the early stage of overvaluation, managers are more 
likely to use accrual-based earnings management. In the later stage, they run out of 
accrual-based earnings management choices and resort to aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure to maintain overvaluation. Second, this paper investigates whether 
corporate governance influences managers’ choice of different earnings management 
mechanisms. The results show that firms with a high proportion of independent 
directors on the board do not choose accrual-based earnings management to sustain 
overvaluation but instead prefer to disclose underlying earnings aggressively in the 
later stage of overvaluation. Firms with a low proportion of independent directors are 
more likely to use both earnings management mechanisms to sustain overvaluation. 
Finally, this paper examines the effects of the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) underlying earnings disclosure guidelines on management’s 
choice of earnings management mechanisms. Because the ASIC guidelines are 
voluntary, we examine the influence of overvaluation on the choice of earnings 
management mechanisms by firms that conform to the guidelines and by those that do 
not. We find that firms that conform to the ASIC underlying earnings disclosure 
guidelines do not use either accrual-based earnings management or aggressive 
underlying earnings disclosure to sustain overvaluation. However, firms that do not 
conform to the ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines are more likely to use 
both accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure to sustain overvaluation. 
The additional test investigates whether the constraints of using accrual-based 
earnings management encourage managers to engage in aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure. This study finds that equity-overvalued firms with a high level of 
accrual-based earnings management constraints only engage in aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure to maintain overvaluation. 
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This paper contributes to the literature on equity overvaluation and earnings 
management by examining whether managers alternate between accrual-based 
earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain 
overvaluation. Three previous studies have examined the association between 
aggressive non-statutory earnings reporting (pro forma earnings) with within-statutory 
earnings management techniques (accrual-based earnings management and/or real 
activities earnings management) (Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 
2010). All three studies found that managers alternate between accrual-based earnings 
management and aggressive non-GAAP earnings reporting. However, they did not 
examine whether the duration of equity overvaluation incentives affects managers’ 
choice to use accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure. Second, although previous studies have examined the relationship between 
non-GAAP earnings and accrual-based earnings management using the absolute value 
of accrual-based earnings management, this paper examines whether managers use 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure and income-increasing accrual-based 
earnings management alternatively or simultaneously. Third, this paper empirically 
tests Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of overvalued equity. Badertscher (2011) 
examined overvaluation and managers’ choice of non-statutory earnings management, 
and found that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in non-GAAP earnings 
management than are firms that are not overvalued. However, Badertscher (2011) 
defined non-GAAP earnings management as firms that identified restatement 
announcements that raised questions about the quality of financial reporting. It is 
unclear whether managers use aggressive non-GAAP earnings reporting as an 
earnings management tool to substitute for other earnings management tools to 
sustain overvalued equity. This paper extends Badertscher (2011) by investigating 
how the duration of overvalued firms affects managers’ use of accrual-based earnings 
management and aggressive underlying earnings (similar to non-GAAP earnings in 
the US) disclosure. Finally, this paper is the first to examine whether corporate 
governance and ASIC’s underlying earnings disclosure guidelines influence 
managers’ decision-making on using different earnings management techniques to 
sustain overvaluation. We extend the results of Baderscher (2011) because we find 
not only that on average, managers use earnings management mechanisms 
alternatively to sustain the equity overvaluation but also that if firms have a lower 
proportion of independent directors or do not conform to the ASIC underlying 
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earnings guidelines, then managers prefer to use earnings management mechanisms 
simultaneously to sustain the equity overvaluation. 
We have organised the paper as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design of this 
study. Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics, Pearson and Spearman correlations, 
and regressions results. Section 6 provides the additional test, and Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Underlying earnings 
Underlying earnings are calculated based on the judgements of the preparer and 
reflect the core/recurring business activities of reporting firms. They are voluntarily 
reported earnings on a basis other than the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), or consistent with IFRS and then adjusted by firm managers 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors [AICD] and Financial Services Institute of 
Australasia [FINSIA], 2009). Firms use various labels to describe underlying 
earnings, including pro forma earnings; normalised earnings; underlying earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT); underlying earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA); earnings before exceptional items; results 
excluding exceptional items; results before non-recurring items; results before 
significant items; results before special items; results before specific items; adjusted 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation; or adjusted operating 
earnings (AICD and FINSIA, 2009; Ernst and Young, 2007). The underlying earnings 
used in this paper represent all such terms because they provide an alternative to 
statutory earnings. Although there is no general agreement on computing underlying 
earnings, significant non-recurring items and IFRS-driven unrealised gains and losses 
are generally often excluded (AICD and FINSIA, 2009). 
The adoption of underlying earnings is a common phenomenon in Australian firms. 
For example, Woodside Petroleum Limited’s 2012 annual report documented that 
‘underlying net profit after tax was $2,061 million, which was a 25% increase on the 
2011 figure’ (Woodside Petroleum, 2012, p. 4). Boral Limited documented a net 
statutory loss of $91 million, whereas underlying profits after tax was a positive $132 
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million in its 2010 annual report (Boral, 2010, p. 23). A study conducted by KPMG in 
2009 found that 84% of firms on the ASX 100 Index presented underlying earnings as 
a response to growing dissatisfaction with statutory earnings as representative of 
firms’ actual economic performance (KPMG, 2009). In 2012, 32 of 50 ASX Index 
firms chose to report financial results using underlying earnings of economic 
performance in addition to statutory earnings (KPMG, 2013). Recently, investors 
have focussed more on underlying earnings than on conventional statutory earnings, 
because underlying earnings are considered a proxy for a firm’s ongoing profitability, 
an approach that is useful for evaluation (AICD and FINSIA, 2009; KPMG, 2009). 
Previous studies have found that managers can use their discretion in defining non-
statutory earnings (i.e., pro forma earnings) in an aggressive manner, considering 
some actual recurring expenses non-recurring expenses to exclude for current 
earnings determination, resulting in a firm with favourable pro forma earnings in the 
context of the US (Bowen et al., 2005; Doyle et al., 2003, 2013; McVay et al., 2006). 
By aggressively defining the pro forma earnings (shifting recurring expenses to non-
recurring items to make non-statutory earnings higher than GAAP earnings), 
managers can achieve their personal interests with fewer costs than with real activities 
and accruals-based earnings management. The joint policy guidance paper produced 
by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) and Financial Services 
Institute of Australasia (FINSIA) argues that a long lead time in producing financial 
statements makes non-statutory reporting necessary (AICD and FINSIA, 2009). The 
publication of non-statutory reporting is termed underlying earnings, presented with a 
reconciliation between statutory earnings and underlying earnings (AICD and 
FINSIA, 2009; Sek and Taylor, 2011). As explained by the AICD and FINSIA (2009) 
report, underlying earnings represent statutory profits adjusted to present a directors’ 
assessment of the results of the ongoing activities of the firm (p. 7). Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) Regulatory Guidance 230 provides the 
following statement in relation to non-IFRS (i.e., non-statutory profits) financial 
information calculation: “A clear explanation should be provided about how the non-
IFRS financial information is calculated” (ASIC, 2011b, p. 18). It further states in 
relation to reconciliation, “A reconciliation between the non-IFRS and IFRS financial 
information should be provided, separately itemising and explaining each significant 
adjustment. When reconciling items are components of IFRS financial information, 
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they should be capable of being reconciled to the financial report. When a reconciling 
item cannot be extracted directly from the financial report, the reconciliation should 
show how the figure is calculated. When comparative non-IFRS financial information 
is presented for a previous period, a reconciliation to the corresponding IFRS 
financial information should be provided for that previous period” (ASIC, 2011b, p. 
18). In implementing the guideline in practice, for instance, the BHP 2017 Annual 
Report states under “Alternative performance measures” that “we use various 
alternate performance measures to reflect our underlying performance. Our two 
primary measures of performance are Underlying attributable profit and Underlying 
EBITDA. These measures, and other alternate performance measures, are reconciled 
below and defined in section 1.12.5” (BHP, 2017, p. 74, first paragraph).  
There is no specific (Auditing Standard) requirement for external auditors “to 
audit” underlying profits because these are non-IFRS profits. However, if a 
Disclosure Reconciliation of Underlying Profits to Statutory Profits is presented, the 
auditor must check the reasonableness of the reconciliation. In addition, ASA 720 The 
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information addresses financial and non-
financial information presented in Other Information (e.g., Annual Report) versus the 
Financial Report (Financial Statements) as follows:  
 
Paragraph 14 (p. 9). The auditor shall read the other information and, in doing so,  
a. Consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the other information 
and the financial report. As the basis for this consideration, the auditor shall, to 
evaluate their consistency, compare selected amounts or other items on other 
information (that are intended to be the same as, to summarise, or to provide 
greater detail about, the amounts or other items in the financial report) with such 
amounts or other items in the financial report; and (Ref: Para. A25–A29) 
b. Consider whether there is a material inconsistency between the other information 
and the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit, in the context of audit 
evidence obtained and conclusions reached in the audit (Ref: Para. A30–A36). 
 
Paragraph 15 (p. 9). While reading the other information in accordance with 
paragraph 14 of this Auditing Standard, the auditor shall remain alert for indications 
that the other information not related to the financial report or the auditor’s 
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knowledge obtained in the audit appears to be materially misstated (Ref: Para. A24, 
A37–A38). 
 
Also applicable is Scope of ASA 720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other 
Information, per paragraphs 1–9 and the Objectives per paragraph 11 of the ASA720 
Auditing Standard. Note paragraphs 2 and 3: 
 
Paragraph 2 (p. 7): This Auditing Standard is written in the context of an audit of a 
financial report by an independent auditor. Accordingly, the objectives of the auditor 
in this Auditing Standard are to be understood in the context of the overall objectives 
of the auditor as stated in paragraph 11 of ASA 200. The requirements in the 
Australian Auditing Standards are designed to enable the auditor to achieve the 
objectives specified in the Australian Auditing Standards, and thereby the overall 
objectives of the auditor. The auditor’s opinion on the financial report does not cover 
the other information; nor does this Auditing Standard require the auditor to obtain 
audit evidence beyond that required to form an opinion on the financial report. 
 
Paragraph 3 (p. 7): This Auditing Standard requires the auditor to read and consider 
the other information because other information that is materially inconsistent with 
the financial report or the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit can indicate that 
there is a material misstatement of the financial report or that a material misstatement 
of the other information exists, either of which can undermine the credibility of the 
financial report and the auditor’s report thereon. Such material misstatements can also 
inappropriately influence the economic decisions of the users for whom the auditor’s 
report is prepared. 
Moreover, unlike accrual-based earnings management and real activity earnings 
management, bottom-line net income is unaffected by using aggressive non-statutory 
earnings disclosure (Fan et al., 2010). Studies have found that when firms have 
limited opportunities to engage in accruals and/or real activity earnings management, 
they are more likely to aggressively disclose pro forma earnings (Black et al., 2014; 
Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). 
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A few recent studies have examined underlying earnings disclosure in Australia. For 
example, Sek and Taylor (2011) described how Australian banks report various 
measures of underlying earnings over time. Cameron et al. (2012) demonstrated the 
underlying earnings of the top 50 ASX-listed non-mining companies between 2007 
and 2009. However, no studies have examined whether equity overvaluation serves as 
an incentive for managers to alternate accrual-based earnings management and 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. Furthermore, none have investigated the 
effect of ASIC’s 2011 underlying earnings disclosure guidelines on managers’ use of 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain the overvaluation, or how firms’ 
corporate governance and ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines affect the 
decision-making of managers to use earnings management mechanisms to sustain the 
equity overvaluation. 
2.2. Agency theory of overvalued equity and earnings management 
Several studies have examined earnings management behaviours based on the agency 
theory of overvalued equity. Using a sample of US data from 1964 to 2003, Chi and 
Gupta (2009) were the first to investigate the association between equity 
overvaluation and accruals management and to examine how overvaluation-induced 
earnings management affects a firm’s future performance. The authors found that 
equity overvaluation intensifies accruals management, which confirms Jensen’s 
(2005) conjecture that equity overvaluation encourages managers to manage earnings. 
Houmes and Skantz (2010) demonstrated that overvalued equity is an incentive for a 
manager’s share option compensation, regardless of other reasons for overvaluation. 
Habib et al. (2013) examined the relationship between overvalued equity firms and 
audit fees in the US context. Their results show that auditors charge higher audit fees 
from clients that use aggressive earnings management because these firms have an 
incentive to overvalue equity. Marciukaityte and Varma (2008) examined the agency 
costs of overvaluating equity in earnings management by investigating a sample of 
526 earnings management firms between 1990 and 2001. Their study found that 
considerable overvaluation of equity pushes managers to manage earnings, but when 
investors notice earnings restatements, managers correct the misstated overvaluation, 
which results in a loss of confidence in the managers. 
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Extending Marciukaityte and Varma (2008), Baderstcher (2011) focussed on the 
degree and duration of overvaluation on the ‘evolution’ of earnings management, 
from accruals management to manipulating real activities, to non-GAAP earnings 
management. The study found that managers engage in accrual-based earnings 
management at the early stage of overvaluation, then resort to real activity earnings 
management to sustain their overvaluation. At the later stage of overvaluation, 
managers are more likely to engage in non-GAAP earnings management. These 
results suggest that equity overvaluation plays a significant role in managers choosing 
alternative earnings management mechanisms during the duration of equity 
overvaluation. Coulton et al. (2014) examined the extent to which overvalued equity 
motivates firms to beat earnings benchmarks and whether beating the benchmark can 
be interpreted as income-increasing earnings management. The authors provided 
evidence that overvaluation-related incentives encourage earnings management and 
that overvalued benchmark beaters have higher levels of abnormal accruals than do 
other firms that beat benchmarks. 
3. Development of hypotheses 
Jensen (2005) proposed that the agency costs of overvalued equity stem from 
managers who cannot (except through pure luck) produce earnings performance to 
maintain an overvalued stock price without participating in earnings management 
techniques. Managers manage earnings to avoid reporting a firm’s true value as lower 
than expected earnings and thus be severely punished by the market (Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002). According to the agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of 
overvalued firms not only reject market correction of overvalued stock prices but also 
tend to sustain overvaluation by engaging in earnings management that increases 
reported earnings because overvaluation is an instant step towards increasing 
managers’ welfare via incentives such as the bonuses and stock options that are 
usually connected with firm performance (Badertscher, 2011). The underlying 
assumption of this study, which builds on Jensen’s (2005) agency theory of 
overvalued equity, is that equity overvaluation can lead to earnings management, and 
managers are likely to use different earnings management mechanisms during the 
duration of equity overvaluation. 
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There are many earnings management choices that managers can use to disguise true 
economic performance and sustain equity overvaluation. The flexibility of accounting 
reporting policy provides opportunities for managers to engage in earnings 
management that makes the firm appear less risky or more profitable than it actually 
is (Fields et al., 2001; Graham et al., 2005). In choosing the type of earnings 
management to utilise, managers must consider the expected costs and benefits of 
alternative earnings management mechanisms. Each accounting choice has its costs 
and benefits, but the net incentives (benefits minus costs) will ultimately determine 
management’s choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms (Desai et al., 
2006; Palmrose et al., 2004). 
Accrual-based earnings management is a popular choice because it has no first-order 
effect on cash flows and can be completed at the end of a period once the amount of 
pre-accrual management earnings is known (Badertscher, 2011; Doukakis, 2014; 
Gunny, 2010). However, accrual-based earnings management has limitations. First, 
aggressive choices about accruals are at a higher risk of regulatory litigation and 
scrutiny because accrual accounting choices are subject to auditor scrutiny, and high 
levels of accrual manipulation tend to be detected by regulators (Graham et al., 2005), 
particularly for publicly listed firms. Second, the reversing nature of accrual-based 
earnings management can be problematic because a firm can reverse the previous 
year’s accrual-based earnings management to influence the current year’s earnings 
(Badertscher, 2011). The reversing nature of accruals can limit the flexibility in 
applying accrual-based earnings management. Some studies argue that firms that used 
accrual-based earnings management extensively in previous periods tend to use other 
earnings management techniques in the current period, particularly if they have a 
continued motivation to manage earnings (Alhadab et al., 2015; Gunny, 2010). 
From a valuation perspective, if the probability of detecting an earnings management 
technique as material misstatements is low, it is less costly than other earnings 
management techniques (Badertscher et al., 2012). Aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure enables management to manage earnings by large amounts without 
reversing them, thus enabling management to achieve specific benchmarks and 
sustain overvalued equity (Badertscher, 2011; Black et al., 2014). However, 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure is not without costs. Studies find that 
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aggressive non-statutory earnings reporting is an egregious form of earnings 
management because share prices decline severely when investors detect 
opportunistic non-statutory earnings reporting, decreasing managers’ reputations 
(Desai et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2005; Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; Palmrose et al., 
2004). 
Along with the agency theory of overvalued equity conjecture, this paper posits that 
the duration of overvaluation affects managers’ decisions to use earnings management 
mechanisms. Specifically, in the early stage of overvaluation, managers are more 
likely to use accrual-based earnings management. Because accrual-based earnings 
management has limitations, this paper argues that the longer the duration of a firm’s 
equity overvaluation, the greater is the manager’s incentive to disclose underlying 
earnings in an aggressive manner to sustain the overvalued equity. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is presented: 
H1: The longer firms are overvalued, the more likely managers will disclose 
underlying earnings aggressively. 
The form of corporate governance that can reduce accrual-based earnings 
management is not a new topic. Recent studies have focussed on examining whether 
corporate governance has a moderating effect on the quality of non-GAAP reporting. 
For example, Frankel et al. (2011) were the first to examine the relationship between 
non-GAAP earnings and the percentage of independent directors on the board. Their 
findings show that firms with a high percentage of independent directors on the board 
exclude items from non-GAAP earnings, suggesting that companies with higher 
corporate governance are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings efficiently. 
However, their study does not provide direct evidence on whether firms with weak 
corporate governance report non-GAAP earnings to mislead investors. Jennings and 
Marques (2011) extend Frankel et al. (2011) by using two attributes of corporate 
governance: percentage of shares held by institutions and percentage of independent 
directors on the board. They provide strong evidence that corporate governance can 
prevent investors from being misled by non-GAAP adjustments and earnings 
disclosed in quarterly earnings announcement press releases. Entwistle et al. (2012) 
examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (i.e., high corporate 
governance, higher quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) are 
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perceived as providing more-credible non-GAAP exclusions than are firms with 
weaker credibility attributes. These authors find that investors view better-governed 
firms, firms audited by high-quality auditors, and higher historical information quality 
firms as providing more-credible non-GAAP exclusions, and investors price the non-
GAAP reporting firms with strong credibility attributes higher than those with poor 
credibility attributes. Isidro and Marques (2014) find that a high-quality board can 
restrain opportunistic management with non-GAAP earnings reporting behaviour, 
particularly by reducing the opportunistic emphasis given to non-GAAP earnings 
reporting in press releases. 
 
The above studies provide evidence that corporate governance plays an important role 
in monitoring and reducing management’s earnings management behaviour. Our 
study attempts to examine whether corporate governance influences the decision-
making of managers to choose earnings management mechanisms to sustain equity 
overvaluation. Because this study is the first in Australia to investigate the influence 
of corporate governance on managers’ use of different earnings management 
mechanisms, hypothesis 2 is stated in null form below: 
 
H2: Corporate governance does not influence managers’ choice to use earnings 
management mechanisms. 
Studies conducted in countries in which compliance with non-GAAP earnings 
reporting is compulsory (e.g., the US), have found that the compulsory introduction of 
non-GAAP guidelines can significantly increase the quality of non-GAAP earnings 
reported. Opportunistic non-GAAP reporting is decreased (Bowen et al., 2005), and 
misleading reporting practices are also decreased (Entwistle et al., 2006). The 
probability that firms will disclose non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat forecasts 
declines (Heflin and Hsu, 2008), and confidence in the market increases (Marques, 
2006). Unlike in the US,2 there are no compulsory regulations that govern managers’ 
																																								 																					
2The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced Regulation G (Reg G), item 10(e) of 
Regulation S-K , and item  12 to govern non-GAAP earnings reported outside financial statements in 
2003. Reg G includes all of the public reporting of  non-GAAP financial valuation containing 
conference calls, press releases, presentations to investors, and other forms of media.  To establish 
transparency in  calculating non-GAAP earnings,  the regulation demands that the reporters reconcile 
non-GAAP earnings with GAAP earnings. Although the SEC attempts to ensure non-GAAP earnings 
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disclosure of underlying earnings in Australian firms. The ASIC issued its 
Consultation Paper  150 in March 2011, proposing guidelines to minimise any 
adverse effect that can result from firms’ underlying earnings disclosures. These 
guidelines state the following: (i) managers should explain the calculation of 
underlying earnings and why it is important to report underlying earnings; (ii) firms 
should not give greater prominence to underlying earnings than to IFRS information; 
(iii) managers should provide a reconciliation between underlying earnings and IFRS 
earnings; and (iv) firms should consistently report underlying earnings (ASIC, 
2011a). In December 2011, ASIC published its Regulatory Guide 230: Disclosing 
Non-IFRS Financial Information as a guide to clarify reporting of underlying 
earnings,  with the aim of preventing users being misled by underlying earnings 
reporting. ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 230 states that firms can disclose underlying 
earnings in communications such as directors’ reports, press releases, notes to 
financial statements, and analyst briefings, but that reporting should not mislead 
financial statement users by giving greater prominence to underlying earnings than 
IFRS earnings information. Firms can disclose underlying earnings when such 
reporting assists in providing a true and fair view of financial statements. Firms must 
also reconcile underlying earnings and IFRS earnings by showing and explaining 
adjustments (ASIC, 2011b). These guidelines are similar to Reg G in the US; 
however, it is mandatory for US firms that disclose underlying earnings to follow Reg 
G, whereas it is voluntary for Australian firms that disclose underlying earnings to 
follow the ASIC’s guidelines. This study examines the influence of the ASIC 
guidelines on managers’ decisions to implement aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure and accrual-based earnings management. The third hypothesis is presented 
in null form below: 
H3: The ASIC underlying earnings disclosure guidelines do not influence managers’ 
choice to use earnings management mechanisms. 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 														
reporting is useful and has not been completed in a misguided manner,  it does not prohibit non-GAAP 
reporting (SEC, 2003). 
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4. Research design 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
This study used a sample of ASX 200 firms from 2009 to 2016. Financial data were 
obtained from the DatAnalysis database. ASX 200 firms were selected as the sample 
frame because the ASX 200 is recognised as the primary investment benchmark in 
Australia. ASX 200 firms cover approximately 78% of Australian equity market 
capitalisation. This paper sets out to examine the post-IFRS period; therefore, 2006, 
2007, and 2008 were avoided because in the three years following the adoption of 
IFRS, many changes were made to financial reporting processes and systems in 
Australian firms that were adopting IFRS standards. To collect the underlying 
earnings data, we searched for information about underlying earnings in the annual 
reports available in the Annual Reports Online database and DatAnalysis, using the 
keywords underlying, adjusted, normalised, earnings before, profit before, and pro 
forma. Following Black and Christensen (2009), we excluded EBIT and EBITDA 
because they are commonly reported as standard steps in the income statement. Table 
1 illustrates the detailed sample selection process. The study found that 658 firm-year 
observations out of 927 firm-year observations in the sample disclosed underlying 
earnings, and that 491 firm-year observations out of 927 firm-year observations in the 
sample disclosed underlying earnings figures greater than statutory earnings figures 
over eight observation years. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
4.2. Measurement of accrual-based earnings management 
4.2.1. Accruals quality 
The quality of accruals is very important in determining the reliability of earnings 
information for users because high-quality earnings map more closely into cash flows 
(Harris et al., 2000). Dechow and Dichev (2002) viewed the accruals matching 
function to cash flows as very important because accruals expect future cash 
collections/payments and reverse them when cash previously recognised in accruals is 
received/paid. Thus, Dechow and Dichev (2002) proposed and tested the quality of 
accruals based on the observation that the total current working capital accrual-based 
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earnings maps into operating cash flows in the previous period, the current period, 
and the next period. The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital 
accruals is an inverse measure of accruals quality (a larger unexplained portion 
indicates poorer quality), and the wider variation in the unexplained portion in 
working capital accruals indicates low-quality accruals (Francis et al., 2005). 
The measure of accruals quality used in this paper is based on Dechow and Dichev’s 
(2002) measure, in which the unexplained portion of the variation in working capital 
accruals is measured as the standard deviation in the residuals using a five-year 
rolling window that ends in 2012 for firm j, year t in the following multivariate 
equation (1): 
TCAj,t = α0 + α1CFOj,t-1 + α2CFOj,t + α3CFOj,t+1 + vj,t (1) 
where j is firm-year observation; t is time period from 2005 to 2012; TCAj,t is firm j’s 
current accruals in year t, = (ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t -ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDj,t), scaled by the total 
assets at the beginning of year t; CFOj,t is cash flow from operations in year t, 
calculated as earnings before tax (Ej,t) less total accruals (TAj,t),3 scaled by the total 
assets at the beginning of year t; and vj,t is residuals from Equation (1) representing 
accrual quality (AQj,t). 
4.2.2. Innate factors of firms and discretional accrual-based earnings management 
Accruals quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying financial 
performance and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, accruals quality is affected by two factors: accruals 
that reflect the innate features of firms and those that reflect discretionary sources. 
Innate features are derived from business models and the operating risk and operating 
environments. Previous studies have shown that innate factors account for 
approximately 50% of variations in the accrual quality metric (Francis et al., 2005, 
2008). Discretionary sources stem from the process of financial reporting and include 
																																								 																					
3 TAj,t = ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t - ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDj,t-DEPNj,t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change in current assets between 
year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current 
liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔCashj,t = firm j’s 
change in cash between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ΔSTDj,t = firm 
j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
year t; and DEPNj,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortisation expenses in year t, scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of year t. 
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the managerial financial reporting implementation decisions, judgements and 
estimates, monitoring and governance, and regulatory scrutiny (Dechow et al., 2010; 
Francis et al., 2005, 2008). 
To separate the innate and discretionary accrual components from accrual quality, (i) 
company size, (ii) standard deviation of cash flow from operations, (iii) standard 
deviation of sales, (iv) length log operating cycle, (v) the incidence of earnings losses, 
and (vi) earnings variability are selected as innate factors.4 Those six innate factors 
are regressed on accruals quality (AQj,t) as follows: 
AQj,t = a0 + a1Sizej,t + a2Opcyclej,t + a3NegEarnj,t + a4Cfoj,t + a5Salesj,t + a5SDEj,t +ej,t (2) 
where j is firm-year observation, t is time period from 2009 to 2016; AQj,t is the 
standard deviation of residuals from Equation (1) for firm j, year t-vj,t; Sizej,t is natural 
logarithm of the total assets for firm j, year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of 
accounts receivable plus days of inventory for firm j, year t; Cfoj,t is standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets, computed 
using a five-year rolling window until 2016 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard 
deviation of sales revenue scaled by beginning total assets, computed using a five-
year rolling window until 2016 for firm j, year t; and NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion 
of losses over the previous five years for firm j, year t. SDEj,t is measured by the 
standard deviation of earnings before tax using a five-year rolling window until 2016 
for firm j, year t. 
Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), Equation (2) is measured by cross-section by 
industry for each year. Because the cross-sectional models require at least 10 firms in 
one industry (Aldamen and Duncan, 2013), this study combined the three smallest 
industry groups into one, giving a total of six industries for each year. The industry 
type is based on the Global Industry Classification Standard industry sector. Eight 
industries were included in the sample: energy, materials, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, healthcare, software, telecommunication services, and utilities. The 
																																								 																					
4 Following Francis et al. (2005), this paper includes company size, standard deviation of cash flow 
from operations, standard deviation of sales, length logarithm operating cycle and incidence of 
earnings losses affecting accruals quality as firms’ innate factors. Previous studies have found that 
earnings variability is highly related to accruals quality and suggests greater variability in earnings and 
lower accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004, 2005). Therefore, earnings 
variability is included as an innate factor affecting accruals quality. 
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telecommunication services (six firms) and the utilities (six firms) were combined 
into one group. Because it is a high-tech industry (three firms), software was included 
in the healthcare category to measure cross-sectional Equation (2).5 This paper 
examines the influence of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management on 
equity overvaluation and expects that when managers are less likely to use income-
increasing accrual-based earnings management, they tend to use income-increasing 
underlying exclusions to overvalue firms’ equity. Thus, following previous studies 
(Baber et al., 2011; Laksmana and Yang, 2014), this paper measures the income-
increasing accrual-based earnings management (InAMj,t) by a dummy variable such 
that the positive residuals of Equation (2)-ej,t are coded as ‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise. The 
predicted values from Equation (2) are the estimated accruals’ innate factors of firms. 
4.3. Measurement of overvaluation 
Following Habib et al. (2013), this paper measures the value of equity using positive 
lagged P/E ratios and positive lagged P/B ratios as proxy for equity overvaluation.6 
The P/E ratio was traditionally used to value companies because P/E valuation is a 
substitute for the well-established discounted earnings model. However, the 
applicability of P/E ratios in valuation has been challenged by both practitioners and 
academics (How and Howe, 2001; Kim and Ritter, 1999). Because transitory earnings 
account for a large part of profits and an increasing number of firms engage in 
earnings management, the usefulness of earnings in valuation declines (Collins et al., 
1997, 1999) due to issues connected with P/E ratios, in which P/B ratios have become 
an increasingly important valuation price-multiple. Studies have shown that when the 
equity’s book value is compared with dividends and earnings, the equity book value 
had the highest explanatory power of empirical models (Collins et al., 1997, 1999). 
However, because different firms identify various numbers of intangible assets on 
their books, the price-multiple calculated using the book value of equity might not be 
																																								 																					
5 This paper follows Aldamen and Duncan’s (2013) measurement of industry type. In that study, 
telecommunication services and utilities were combined into one industry group to measure the cross-
sectional model. 
6 Empirical evidence shows that equity overvaluation is positively related to the subsequent income-
increasing earnings management (Chi and Gupta, 2009), and highly valued firms tend to use 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards in the year following the overpricing (Houmes and 
Skantz, 2010). This study, following Habib et al. (2013), uses lagged measurements. This paper also 
trimmed the top and the bottom one per cent of the sample. 
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applied to firms with different proportions of unrecognised intangible assets (How et 
al., 2007, p. 106). Because the P/E ratios and P/B ratios have limitations, the valuation 
of equity is measured by the average of lagged P/E ratios and lagged P/B ratios in this 
paper.7 Using aggregative measurement by averaging the two is appropriate because 
lagged P/E ratios and lagged P/B ratios present one factor (see Table 3, Panel B factor 
analysis). This research design is framed to be consistent with Jensen’s (2005) view 
that equity overvaluation drives managers to manipulate earnings (see Appendix for 
variables’ proxy and measurement). 
To identify equity-overvalued firms, firms are ranked based on the PEPBj,t ratio for 
each year, where those firms in the highest quartile rank8 of PEPBj,t indicate equity 
overvaluation. To capture the notion of sustained equity overvaluation or duration of 
equity overvaluation, this paper identifies firms that have been in the top quartile of 
PEPBj,t for 1 (Over1j,t), 2(Over2j,t), 3(Over3j,t), 4(Over4j,t), 5 or more than 5 (Over5j,t) 
consecutive years. 
4.4. Duration of equity overvaluation and earnings management (H1) 
The models for testing H1 were designed as follows: 
EMj,t=a0+∑b0-5Over(i)j,t+c1Controlsj,t+ c2Year effects +c3Industry effects +ej,t (3) 
where j is firm-year observation, t is time period from 2009 to 2016. 
Dependent variables: EMj,t is either InExj,t or InAMj,t. InExj,t is aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm discloses an 
underlying earnings number that is greater than the statutory earnings in year t, and 0 
otherwise. InAMj,t is income-increasing accrual-based earnings management that 
equals 1 if residuals (ej,t) of Equation (2) is positive, or 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: Over(i)j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if j firm has been in the 
top quartile of PEPBj,t for (i) consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, Over1j,t 
equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for one year during the sample years, and 0 
																																								 																					
7 P/E ratios and P/B ratios have been ranked as high and low; the PEPB is the average of the rankings. 
8 Unlike Badertscher (2011), this paper uses quartile value rather than quintile value due to the small 
sample size. Therefore, following Habib et al. (2013), this paper measures overvalued equity using 
quartile values. 
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otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for two consecutive years during 
the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for three 
consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm 
was overvalued for four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. 
Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm was overvalued for five or more than five consecutive years 
during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables: Following the literature, this paper includes several control 
variables that influence the likelihood of firm equity overvaluation and earnings 
management. 
Accruals-specific controls: Following previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Black et 
al., 2014; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), this paper includes an indicator variable 
Litigationj,t that equals 1 if j firm is in a high litigation risk industry to capture the 
litigation penalties.9 This paper includes Litigationj,t as a specific control variable 
because accrual-based earnings management is more likely than aggressive 
underlying earnings disclosure to be detected and punished; thus, greater perceived 
litigation penalties should decrease the tendency for accrual-based earnings 
management. 
Another specific control variable for accruals widely recorded in the accounting 
literature is Big4 auditors. Following previous studies (Badertscher, 2011; Black et 
al., 2014; Doukakis, 2014), this paper includes Big4j,t as a specific control variable 
that is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s auditor is a Big 4 audit 
company, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included because previous studies suggest 
that auditors play a monitoring role, and the presence of a Big 4 auditor restricts 
accrual-based earnings management practices (Francis and Wang, 2008). It is 
expected that increased scrutiny enhances the probability of discovering accrual-based 
earnings management, but such scrutiny should not affect a manager’s decision to 
aggressively disclose underlying earnings because it typically falls outside an 
auditor’s responsibility. 
																																								 																					
9 Following Barton and Simko (2002) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), high-litigation industries are 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, and service industries. Pharmaceuticals/biotechnology is a 
sub-group of the healthcare sector. 
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Underlying earnings-specific controls: Previous research indicates that meeting 
earnings targets and avoiding current statutory losses is a useful means of explaining 
pro forma earnings disclosures. These studies suggest that managers have strong 
incentives to manipulate non-statutory earnings when firms miss their earnings targets 
or experience current statutory earnings losses (Barth et al., 2012; Black and 
Christensen, 2009; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010; Hitz, 2010; Isidro and 
Marques, 2014). This paper includes the dummy variable Lossj,t, which equals 1 if j 
firm experiences a current statutory earnings loss in year t, and 0 otherwise, whereas 
the dummy variable Meetj,t equals 1 if j firm’s current statutory earnings are greater 
than or equal to previous statutory earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
General control variables include Leveragej,t (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Doukakis, 2014; Francis and Wang, 2008); firm growth measured by market-to-book 
ratio (MtoBj,t) and sales growth (SalesGj,t) (Black et al., 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; 
Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; Zang, 2012); firm profitability, measured by return of 
equity (ROEj,t) (Doukakis, 2014; Doyle et al., 2007, 2013; Frankel et al., 2011); and 
capital intensity (Capitalj,t) (Baginski et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2004). This study 
also includes net operating assets at the beginning of the year as a control variable, 
because previous net operating assets – which indicate the balance sheet constraints – 
affect current managers’ decisions to use earnings management (Badertscher, 2011). 
Net operating assets at the beginning of a year (NOAj,t) are measured by shareholders’ 
equity minus cash, cash equivalent, plus total debt, divided by lagged sales for firm j, 
at the beginning of year t. Firm size (Mktcapj,t) is measured by the natural logarithm 
of market capitalisation at the beginning of year t (Doukakis, 2014; Ettredge et al., 
2005; Lundholm and Myers, 2002). This paper includes the year and industry effects 
to control the unobservable confounding variables that differ from time to time, but 
are constant across industries, and the unobservable confounding variables that differ 
across industries, but are constant over time. Corporate governance is measured by 
the percentage of independent directors on the board (INDj,t) in relation to the total 
number of directors on the board. We obtained corporate governance data from the 
corporate governance section of the annual report of each firm. 
This study includes underlying earnings disclosure or accrual-based earnings 
management because control variables in previous studies indicated that accrual-
 23 
based earnings management and non-statutory earnings disclosures are substitute 
mechanisms of earnings management (Black et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Doukakis, 2014; Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010). If the dependent variable is 
accrual-based earnings management (InAMj,t), then it controls for aggressive 
underlying earnings disclosures (InExj,t); the converse also applies. 
To examine the influence of corporate governance in H2, we divided our sample into 
two sub-samples: firms with high corporate governance versus firms with low 
corporate governance. Each year is ranked on INDj,t, and the upper quartile
 
of INDj,t is 
selected as a proxy of high corporate governance, whereas the lower quartile of INDj,t 
is selected as a proxy of low corporate governance. 
To examine H3 – that is, whether ASIC underlying earnings guidelines in 2011 would 
affect managers’ decision-making in using different earnings management techniques 
to sustain equity overvaluation – we examined the post-ASIC underlying earnings 
guidelines period (2013–2016)10 and restricted our sample to the firms that disclosed 
underlying earnings. Because the guidelines are voluntarily followed by firms, we 
divided our sample into two sub-samples: firms that voluntarily conform to the 
guidelines and firms that do not voluntarily conform to the guidelines to disclose 
underlying earnings. If a firm conforms to all of ASIC’s guidelines – (i) firms explain 
the calculation of underlying earnings and why it is important to report them; (ii) 
firms do not provide greater prominence to underlying earnings than to IFRS 
earnings; (iii) firms provide a reconciliation between underlying earnings and IFRS 
earnings; and (iv) firms consistently report underlying earnings (ASIC, 2011a, 2011b) 
– over the four reporting periods from 2013 to 2016, then the study considers the firm 
compliant. 
5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 documents the descriptive statistics of the variables for earnings management 
and equity overvaluation variables and shows the differences between the top and 
bottom quartiles. For the earnings management mechanisms (InAMj,t: income-
																																								 																					
10 We avoid 2011 and 2012 because we want to leave time for firms to familiarise themselves with the 
guidelines. 
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increasing accrual-based earnings management, and InExj,t: aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure), the median of InAMj,t (0.000) is lower than the median of InExj,t 
(1.000), which means that sample firms are more likely to disclose underlying 
earnings aggressively. Examining the overvaluation variables, the mean and median 
of PEj,t (15.274 and 14.190, respectively) are higher than the mean and median of 
PBj,t (2.607 and 1.830, respectively). The mean (median) of PBPEj,t is 8.940 (8.190), 
with an interquartile range of (5.870) to (11.285). 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
5.2. Pearson and Spearman correlations and factor analysis 
Table 3, Panel A shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations of key variables. 
InExj,t is significantly negatively correlated with InAMj,t under Spearman correlation 
(correlation = -0.002, p-value = 0.046) and Pearson correlation (correlation = -0.043, 
p-value = 0.040). These results confirm those of previous studies (Black et al., 2014; 
Doyle et al., 2013; Elshafie et al., 2010), in which accrual-based earnings 
management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosures are substitute earnings 
management mechanisms. Moving on to the correlations between earnings 
management mechanisms and overvaluation measurements, InAMj,t is significantly 
positively correlated to Over1j,t and Over2j,t under both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation tests. InExj,t is significantly positively correlated to Over3j,t, Over4j,t, and 
Over5j,t under Pearson and Spearman correlations. Table 3, Panel B presents the factor 
analysis for measuring overvaluation and indicates that the PE and PB ratios represent 
one factor. Therefore, this paper appropriately combines the two measurement ratios 
into one variable to represent a firm’s valuation measurement. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
5.3. Regression results 
5.3.1. Results for duration of overvaluation and earnings management mechanisms 
(H1) 
Table 4 shows the results of H1 using the time-industry fixed-effects logit regression 
model. The first and second models are tested with dependent InAMj,t and InExj,t, 
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respectively. The results of the first model show that InAMj,t is significantly positively 
related to Over1j,t (coefficient = 0.571, p-value = 0.025) and to Over2j,t (coefficient = 
1.507, p-value = 0.065), whereas Over3j,t Over4j,t, and Over5j,t are not significantly 
associated with InAMj,t. The results of the first model suggest that in the early stage of 
overvaluation, firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing accrual-based 
earnings management. In the later stage of overvaluation, managers are less likely to 
use income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, which could be explained 
by the reversing nature of accrual-based earnings management, in which managers’ 
ability to use income-increasing accrual-based earnings management decreases. The 
second model demonstrates that InExj,t is significantly positively associated with 
Over3j,t (coefficient = 0.877, p-value = 0.007), Over4j,t (coefficient = 1.007, p-value = 
0.027), and Over5j,t (coefficient = 0.939, p-value = 0.002); thus, after a firm has been 
overvalued in the early stage using income-increasing earnings management, firms 
tend to sustain their equity overvaluation by engaging in aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure to define underlying earnings as higher than statutory earnings. 
The results of Table 4 demonstrate that after an extended period of equity 
overvaluation, firms are unable to engage in further accrual-based earnings 
management and therefore resort to disclosing underlying earnings aggressively. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
5.3.2. Influence of corporate governance on managers’ choice to use earnings 
management mechanisms (H2) 
Table 5 shows the time-industry fixed-effects logit regression results for H2. The first 
and second models show the results of firms with high corporate governance (i.e., a 
high proportion of independent directors), whereas the third and fourth models show 
the results of firms with low corporate governance (i.e., a low proportion of 
independent directors). The results show that for the high corporate governance firms, 
only Over1j,t is very weakly significant and positively related with InAMj,t (coefficient 
= 0.866, p-value = 0.096); however, Over4j,t and Over5j,t are significantly positively 
associated with InExj,t (coefficient = 0.057, p-value = 0.043; coefficient = 0.232, p-
value = 0.020, respectively). In the low corporate governance firms, InAMj,t is 
significantly positively related with Over1j,t (coefficient = 2.110, p-value = 0.053), 
Over2j,t (coefficient = 1.572, p-value = 0.022), Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.493, p-value = 
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0.004), and over4j,t (coefficient = 2.058, p-value = 0.010); InExj,t is significantly 
positively associated with Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.176, p-value = 0.034), Over4j,t 
(coefficient = 0.112, p-value = 0.049), and Over5j,t (coefficient = 0.586, p-value = 
0.000). The results suggest that corporate governance could constrain managers to 
apply accrual-based earnings management to sustain the early years of equity 
overvaluation but could not restrain managers from using aggressive underlying 
earnings disclosure in the later years of equity overvaluation. Specifically, the 
managers in high corporate governance firms sustain the later stage of equity 
overvaluation by aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. The managers in low 
corporate governance firms apply both earnings management mechanisms to sustain 
equity overvaluation. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
5.3.3. Influence of ASIC underlying earnings guidelines on using earnings 
mechanisms (H3) 
Table 6 shows the year industry fixed-effects logit regression results for H3. Because 
ASIC guidelines are voluntarily followed by reporting firms, we investigate two sub-
samples (i.e., firms that conform to ASIC guidelines and firms that do not conform to 
ASIC guidelines) to understand the influence of the guidelines on managers’ choice 
of earnings management to sustain overvaluation. We focus on the post-ASIC period 
(i.e., 2013–2016) and limit our analysis to the observations that disclose underlying 
earnings to test H3. The first and second models present the results for the sample 
with the observations that conform to ASIC underlying earnings disclosure 
guidelines, whereas the third and fourth models show the results for the sample with 
the observations that do not conform to ASIC underlying earnings disclosure 
guidelines. The results show that for the compliant firms, only Over2j,t is significantly 
positively associated with InExj,t (coefficient = 0.897, p-value = 0.046); none of the 
other overvaluations are related to either InAMj,t or InExj,t. For the non-compliant 
firms, InAMj,t is significantly positively related to Over1j,t (coefficient = 4.102, p-value 
= 0.050), Over2j,t (coefficient = 2.778, p-value = 0.003), and Over3j,t (coefficient = 
0.313, p-value = 0.061); InExj,t is significantly positively associated with Over2j,t 
(coefficient = 1.442, p-value = 0.007), Over3j,t (coefficient = 2.797, p-value = 0.003), 
and Over4j,t (coefficient = 0.983, p-value = 0.056). The results suggest that firms that 
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conform to the ASIC guidelines are less likely to use earnings mechanisms to sustain 
equity overvaluation, whereas non-compliant firms use both accrual-based earnings 
management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain equity 
overvaluation.  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
6. Additional tests 
6.1. Limited ability using accrual-based earnings management  
To provide further evidence on how earnings management choices interact as the 
duration of overvaluation increases, this study examines a subset of firms that are 
likely to be constrained in their ability to manage earnings through accruals. 
According to Jensen (2005), the duration of overvaluation motivates managers to 
engage in different earnings management techniques. This paper assumes that if the 
firm has a limited ability to use accrual-based earnings management, the firm will 
more likely engage in aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. We expect that 
accrual-based earnings management-constrained firms are more likely to engage in 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain overvaluation. 
Because overvalued firms decide to manage reported earnings, this section 
investigates whether the constraints of using accrual-based earnings management 
would encourage managers to disclose underlying earnings or to disclose them in an 
aggressive manner. Due to the constrained flexibility of accruals, the ability of 
managers to manage accruals upwards in the current period is limited by accrual 
management activities in previous periods. This paper follows previous studies 
(Badertscher, 2011; Barton and Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012), in which net operating 
assets (NOAj,t) are used as a proxy for the extent of accruals management in previous 
periods to represent a firm’s ability to manage earnings using accruals. If the net 
operating assets at the beginning of the year are high, managers’ abilities to use 
accruals to manipulate earnings are reduced in the current year because the balance 
sheet and income statement are articulated. Therefore, abnormal accruals shown in 
past earnings can also be shown in net assets; hence, the latter are overstated when 
firms have practised accrual management previously (Barton and Simko, 2002; Black 
et al., 2014; Zang, 2012). Because the underlying earnings exclusions do not include a 
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practical accounting system entry (there are no debit and credit adjustments required), 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure is not necessarily constrained by the 
balance sheet, as accruals would be (Doyle et al., 2013). 
To investigate whether firms with constraints on engaging accrual-based earnings 
management are more likely to disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain 
the equity overvaluation, this section focusses on a sub-sample of firms that are 
constrained in their ability to engage in accrual-based earnings management. This 
sub-sample is measured by net operating assets (NOAj,t). High values of NOAj,t 
represent low ability to manipulate earnings using accruals in the current year. To 
calculate the high values of NOAj,t, each year is ranked on NOAj,t, and the upper 
quartile
 
of NOAj,t is selected as a proxy of accruals constraining firms. 
These results (presented in Table 7) indicate that firms with limited accrual-based 
earnings management options do not engage in accrual-based earnings management. 
As the duration of overvaluation increases, they disclose underlying earnings 
aggressively to maintain overvaluation. Specifically, the first model finds that Over2j,t 
is significantly negatively associated with InAMj,t (coefficient = -0.205, p-value = 
0.020),11 and the second model finds that InExj,t is significantly positively associated 
with Over2j,t (coefficient = 0.515, p-value = 0.042), Over3j,t (coefficient = 0.790, p-
value = 0.008), Over4j,t (coefficient = 1.855, p-value = 0.042), and Over5j,t (coefficient 
= 0.807, p-value =0.000). The results in Table 7 suggest that if accrual-constrained 
firms find it difficult to apply accrual-based earnings management, they tend to 
disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain the overvaluation. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
																																								 																					
11	We have found that the coefficient of OVER on InAM (income-increasing accrual earnings 
management) turns negative (after Over1) when there is a high level of accrual earnings management 
constraints. This result differs from Badertscher’s (2011) for the following two reasons: first, InAM is 
a dummy variable; second, there are significant variations between Australia and the US in relation to 
market competition, firm characteristics, economic structure, governance environment, and major 
industries. For example, Australia follows a principle-based balance sheet-oriented conceptual 
framework in accounting judgement, a common law legal system, a high level of shareholder 
protection, and low conformity between taxation reporting and financial accounting; in addition, there 
are some differences with the US in terms of regulatory and reporting environments (Chalmers et al., 
2008, 2011; Lont et al., 2010).  
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7. Conclusion 
This study tests and extends the assumption developed by Jensen’s (2005) agency 
theory of overvalued equity. The purposes of this paper are as follows: first, to 
examine whether the duration of overvaluation affects managers’ choice to use 
accrual-based earnings management and aggressive underlying earnings disclosure; 
second, to investigate the influences of corporate governance on managers’ choice to 
use different earnings management mechanisms to sustain the equity overvaluation; 
and third, to examine the effects of the ASIC underlying reporting guidelines on 
managers’ choice to use different earnings management mechanisms to sustain the 
equity overvaluation. Jensen (2005) predicts that overvaluation leads managers to 
engage in alternative earnings management techniques to sustain the firm’s 
overvalued equity. This paper provides evidence that is consistent with this reasoning, 
finding that overvalued firms engage in accrual-based earnings management in the 
early stage. As overvaluation continues, overvalued firms are more likely to disclose 
underlying earnings and to do so in an aggressive manner to maintain the 
overvaluation. Furthermore, this paper finds that in firms with low corporate 
governance, managers are more likely to use both earnings management techniques to 
sustain equity overvaluation, whereas in firms with high corporate governance, 
managers do not apply accrual-based earnings management, although they 
nevertheless disclose underlying earnings aggressively to sustain equity 
overvaluation. Finally, this study shows that firms that do not conform to the ASIC 
guidelines are more likely to sustain the overvaluation by using both earnings 
management techniques, whereas this behaviour is not observed in firms that conform 
to the ASIC guidelines. Additional tests demonstrate that when managers are 
constrained by using accrual-based earnings management, they will only engage in 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure to sustain the overvaluation. 
Two limitations should be considered when interpreting the results. First, aggressive 
underlying earnings disclosure is new in the earnings management literature. Due to a 
lack of guidance found in the literature, the control variables of underlying earnings 
might not have comprehensively explained underlying earnings disclosure. This paper 
focussed on the managers’ choice to use accrual-based earnings management or 
aggressive underlying earnings disclosure. A future study can examine the influence 
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of real activities of earnings management on aggressive underlying earnings 
disclosure. Second, although we use models of time-industry effects to control for the 
unobservable confounding variables that differ from time to time and for 
unobservable confounding variables that differ across industries, we could not fully 
control for all other unobservable variables that influence the explanatory variables. 
The results of this paper provide several avenues for future research. First, because 
the paper only examined the relationship between overvaluation and managers’ 
decisions to use accrual-based earnings management and underlying earnings 
disclosure, researchers can extend the effect of the real activity earnings management 
on overvaluation and managers’ choices to use accrual-based earnings management, 
real activities earnings management, and underlying earnings disclosure. Second, 
future research could also examine the factors that cause firms to become overvalued 
and the interventions that can mitigate the agency costs of overvalued equity, such as 
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Results tables  
Table 1: sample selection 
Sample selection  
 Firm-year observations 




Diversified financials 36 
Real estate 76 
Missing data 121 
Final group investigated 927 
Underlying earnings reporting 658 
Reported underlying earnings 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables 
Variable Observation Mean LowQ Median TopQ Std. Dev. 
InAMj,t 927 0.406 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.491 
InExj,t 927 0.530 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 
INDj,t 927 0.697 0.600 0.750 0.833 0.171 
PEj,t 927 15.274 10.150 14.190 18.970 8.541 
PBj,t 927 2.607 1.120 1.830 3.080 2.379 
PBPEj,t 927 8.940 5.870 8.190 11.285 4.759 
Note: InAMj,t is positive of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents 
income-increasing accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 
1 if j firm discloses underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. INDj,t is 
percentage of independent directors on the board. PEj,t is price-to-earnings ratio for j firm in year t, which is 
collected from DatAnalysis database. PBj,t is price-to-book ratio for j firm in year t, which is collected from 









Table 3: Pearson and Spearman correlations and factor analysis 
Table 3 Panel A: Pearson and Spearman correlations for variables 
 
InAMj,t InExj,t INDj,t  Over1j,t Over2j,t Over3j,t Over4j,t Over5j,t 
InAMj,t 1.000 -0.043** 0.021 0.030** 0.058** 0.014 0.019 0.036 
 
 
(0.040) (0.525) (0.045) (0.048) (0.640) (0.518) (0.226) 
InExj,t -0.002** 1.000 0.168*** 0.015 0.009* 0.035** 0.004** 0.066*** 
 (0.046) 
 
(0.000) (0.620) (0.075) (0.029) (0.035) (0.001) 
INDj,t  0.021 0.176*** 1.000 0.057* -0.022 -0.016 -0.089*** -0.008 
 (0.524) (0.000) 
 
(0.083) (0.504) (0.619) (0.006) (0.816) 
Over1j,t 0.023** 0.010 0.052 1.000 -0.019 -0.013 -0.017 -0.057* 
 (0.042) (0.750) (0.116) 
 
(0.529) (0.658) (0.564) (0.052) 
Over2j,t 0.071** 0.002* -0.024 -0.021 1.000 -0.016 -0.021 -0.071** 
 (0.029) (0.081) (0.472) (0.527) 
 
(0.583) (0.473) (0.016) 
Over3j,t 0.008 0.036** -0.021 -0.015 -0.019 1.000 -0.015 -0.050* 
 (0.810) (0.027) (0.518) (0.657) (0.572) 
 
(0.614) (0.090) 
Over4j,t 0.015 0.019** -0.066** -0.019 -0.025 -0.017 1.000 -0.065** 
 
(0.659) (0.045) (0.043) (0.555) (0.453) (0.598) 
 
(0.027) 
Over5j,t 0.006 0.104*** -0.003 -0.065** -0.082** -0.058* -0.077** 1.000 
 
(0.865) (0.002) (0.929) (0.047) (0.012) (0.077) (0.019) 
 p-value in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Pearson (above) and Spearman (below) correlations 
Table 3 Panel B: Factor analysis for overvaluation variables 
Factor   Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 (PB ratios) 1.182 0.365 0.5912 0.5912 
Factor2 (PE ratios) 0.818 0.000 0.4088 1.0000 
Number of obs 927 
   
Retained factors 1 
   
Number of params 1 
   
chi2(1) 31.62 
   
Prob>chi2 0 
   
Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued for one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 
1 if j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm 
is overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive 
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing 
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. INDj,t is percentage of independent 






Table 4: Regression results for overvaluation and earnings management 
(H1) 
		 InAMj,t as dependent variable InExj,t as dependent variable 
		 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Over1j,t 0.571** 2.240 0.025 0.177 0.300 0.763 
Over2j,t 1.507* 1.850 0.065 0.783* 1.670 0.096 
Over3j,t 0.912 1.200 0.293 0.877*** 2.690 0.007 
Over4j,t -0.185 -0.290 0.225 1.007** 2.210 0.027 
Over5j,t -0.125 -0.400 0.464 0.939*** 3.090 0.002 
AM specific 
	 	 	 	 	 	
Big4j,t -0.888** -2.110 0.035 	 	 	
Litigationj,t -0.952 -1.560 0.119 	 	 	
UE specific 
	 	 	 	 	 	
Meetj,t 	 	 	
-0.514*** -2.930 0.003 
Lossj,t 	 	 	 1.786
*** 6.760 0.000 
General controls 
	 	 	 	 	 	
InExj,t -0.766*** -3.920 0.000 	 	 	
InAMj,t 	 	 	
-0.767*** -3.950 0.000 
Leveragej,t 0.486 1.130 0.257 1.413*** 2.960 0.003 
SalesGj,t -0.158 -0.410 0.680 -0.146 -0.400 0.687 
MtoBj,t -0.111 -1.550 0.121 -0.154*** -3.010 0.003 
Mktcapj,t 0.183*** 2.610 0.009 0.095 1.640 0.101 
NOAj,t -0.275* 1.880 0.060 0.002 0.240 0.807 
ROEj,t -0.002 -0.410 0.685 0.003 1.390 0.164 
Capitalj,t 0.046 0.210 0.831 -0.139 -0.790 0.427 
INDj,t 0.368 0.670 0.502 1.761*** 3.690 0.000 
_cons -0.600 -0.690 0.489 -1.642** -2.440 0.015 












Pseudo R2 28.30% 		 		 17.00% 		 		
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if 
j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive 
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing 
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Sizej,t is natural logarithm of the 
total assets for firm j, year t; Opcyclej,t is natural logarithm of days of accounts receivable plus days of inventory 
for firm j, year t; Cfoj,t is standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets, 
computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in year 2012 for firm j, year t; Salesj,t is standard deviation of sales 
revenue scaled by beginning total assets, computed using a 5-year rolling window ended in 2012 for firm j, year t; 
NegEarnj,t is firm’s proportion of losses over the prior 5 years for firm j, year t. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited 
by Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. SDEj,t  is measured by standard deviation of earnings before tax using a 5-year 
rolling window ending in 2012 for firm j, year t. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, 
software, or services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings 
before tax in year t is greater than or equals to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t  is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book 
equity ratio for firm j in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. 
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Leveragej,t is measured by short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is 
measured by shareholders’ equity less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided 
by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is  the sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by  the sales 
for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the 
beginning of year t for firm j. Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property, 































































Table 5: Regression results for impact of corporate governance on overvaluation 
and earnings management (H2) 
 
Firms with a high proportion of 
independent directors on the board 
Firms with a low proportion of 
independent directors on the board 
 InAM InEx InAM InEx 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Over1j,t 0.866* -0.833 2.110** 0.067 
 (0.096) (0.317) (0.053) (0.931) 
Over2j,t 1.379 0.118 1.572** 0.453 
 (0.284) (0.697) (0.022) (0.476) 
Over3j,t -1.243 0.848 2.493*** 2.176** 
 (0.611) (0.974) (0.004) (0.034) 
Over4j,t 1.425 0.057** 2.058** 0.112** 
 (0.272) (0.043) (0.010) (0.049) 
Over5j,t 0.359 0.232** 0.641 0.586*** 
 (0.400) (0.020) (0.551) (0.000) 
AM specific   




 (0.025)  (0.478) 
 Litigationj,t 2.706  -0.081 
 
 (0.988)  (0.943) 
 UE specific   
  Meetj,t  -0.123 
 
-0.699* 







  (0.002) 
 
(0.060) 
General controls  
  InExj,t -0.689**  0.477 
 
 (0.049)  (0.304) 




  (0.012) 
 
(0.272) 
Leveragej,t 1.603** 0.573 0.852 0.737 
 (0.042) (0.245) (0.350) (0.370) 
SalesGj,t -0.111 0.008 0.225 0.796 
 (0.481) (0.933) (0.772) (0.260) 
MtoBj,t 0.019 0.013 -0.495*** -0.100 
 (0.836) (0.343) (0.004) (0.487) 
Mktcapj,t 0.220** 0.364*** -0.397* 0.083 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.076) (0.587) 
NOAj,t -0.008* 0.002 -0.566* 0.054 
 (0.096) (0.797) (0.093) (0.723) 
ROEj,t 0.004 0.009 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.648) (0.940) (0.664) (0.410) 
Capitalj,t 0.058 0.458*** 0.625 -0.236 
 (0.716) (0.002) (0.256) (0.614) 
_cons -5.017*** -3.929*** 2.140 0.368 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.815) 
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Table 5 continued  
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs 232 232 232 232 
Pseudo R2 42.4% 21.2% 39.0% 17.7% 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 p-value in parentheses 
Note: Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. 
Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm 
is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive 
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing 
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or 
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year 
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t  is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j 
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by 
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity 
less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is  the 
sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by  the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. 
Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total 































Table 6: Regression results for impact of ASIC underlying earnings disclosure 
guidelines on overvaluation and earnings management (H3) 
 
Firms that voluntarily conform to the 
guidelines 
Firms that do not voluntarily 
conform to the guidelines 
 InAM InEx InAM InEx 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Over1j,t 0.907 0.269 4.102** 1.095 
 (0.256) (0.537) (0.050) (0.463) 
Over2j,t 1.167 0.897** 2.778*** 1.442*** 
 (0.162) (0.046) (0.003) (0.007) 
Over3j,t 0.529 0.272 0.313* 2.797*** 
 (0.537) (0.556) (0.061) (0.003) 
Over4j,t 1.543 -1.138 -0.596 0.983** 
 (0.397) (0.113) (0.455) (0.056) 
AM specific   




 (0.025)  (0.820) 
 Litigationj,t -2.116***  -2.870
*** 
 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
 UE specific   
  Meetj,t  -0.624 
 
-1.085*** 







  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
General controls  
  InExj,t -1.764  1.839
** 
 
 (0.268)  (0.018) 
 InAMj,t  -0.581 
 
1.522** 
  (0.611) 
 
(0.018) 
Leveragej,t 0.931 5.010** 0.702 2.880** 
 (0.818) (0.014) (0.773) (0.015) 
SalesGj,t 0.489 0.753 -3.195* 0.731 
 (0.911) (0.599) (0.051) (0.358) 
MtoBj,t 0.469 0.091 -0.100 -0.241*** 
 (0.479) (0.653) (0.476) (0.006) 
Mktcapj,t 0.433 -0.127 0.445 -0.067 
 (0.504) (0.577) (0.125) (0.576) 
NOAj,t -1.787** 0.331 -0.793** 0.001 
 (0.041) (0.162) (0.031) (0.928) 
ROEj,t 0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.006 
 (0.850) (0.434) (0.659) (0.257) 
Capitalj,t 8.492 0.479 0.272 -1.362** 
 (0.158) (0.764) (0.810) (0.047) 
INDj,t -8.646** 0.187 4.831 1.071 
 (0.015) (0.910) (0.162) (0.226) 
_cons -8.771 1.382 -1.868 2.808** 
 (0.114) (0.499) (0.450) (0.027) 
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Table 6 continued  
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs 152 152 187 187 
Pseudo R2 47.0% 26.6% 31.9% 29.4% 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 p-value in parentheses 
Note: Over0j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued once during the sample years from 2009 to 2012, and 0 otherwise. 
Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if j firm 
is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive 
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing 
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by 
Big 4 auditors, ad 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or 
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year 
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t  is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if j firm reports statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j 
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by 
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. NOAj,t is measured by shareholders’ equity 
less cash and cash equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales. SalesGj,t is  the 
sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by  the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. 
Capitalj,t is capital intensity measured by the ratio of net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total 
assets for firm j, year t. Limit the observations that report underlying earnings from 2013 to 2016 (total 339; 38 




















Table 7: Regression results for additional analysis (limited ability of using 
accrual-based earnings management) 
		 InAMj,t as dependent variable InExj,t as dependent variable 
		 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Over1j,t 0.726 1.190 0.138 0.629 0.070 0.393 
Over2j,t -0.205** 4.190 0.020 0.515** 2.040 0.042 
Over3j,t -2.275 2.710 0.950 0.790*** 5.850 0.008 
Over4j,t -1.613 -1.040 0.297 1.855** 2.040 0.042 
Over5j,t 1.535 1.200 0.230 0.807*** 5.980 0.000 
AM specific 
	 	 	 	 	 	
Big4j,t -0.804 -0.910 0.360 	 	 	
Litigationj,t 2.204** 1.960 0.050 	 	 	
UE specific 
	 	 	 	 	 	
Meetj,t 	 	 	
-0.345 -0.880 0.378 
Lossj,t 	 	 	 3.267
*** 4.060 0.000 
General controls 
	 	 	 	 	 	
InExj,t -0.708** -2.200 0.028 	 	 	
InAMj,t 	 	 	
-0.422 -1.240 0.216 
Leveragej,t 1.037 1.060 0.287 1.012 0.970 0.332 
SalesGj,t -0.586 -0.760 0.450 0.160 0.190 0.850 
MtoBj,t 0.005 0.020 0.984 -0.783*** -3.070 0.002 
Mktcapj,t 0.020 0.150 0.881 0.445*** 2.910 0.004 
ROEj,t -0.610 -0.310 0.754 -0.409 -0.200 0.844 
Capitalj,t -0.477 -1.280 0.201 1.194*** 2.880 0.004 
INDj,t -1.156 -1.200 0.230 0.798 0.780 0.435 
_cons. -5.980 -1.380 0.166 -1.390 0.730 0.467 












Pseudo R2  47.00% 		 		 24.50% 		 		
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: Over1j,t equals 1 if j firm is overvalued one year during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over2j,t equals 1 if 
j firm is overvalued two consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over3j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued three consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over4j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued four consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. Over5j,t equals 1 if j firm is 
overvalued five or more than five consecutive years during the sample years, and 0 otherwise. InAMj,t is positive 
of ‘abnormal’ accruals (the positive of residuals (ej,t) from Equation (2)), which represents income-increasing 
accrual-based earnings management for firm j, year t. InExj,t is a dummy variable which equals 1 if j firm discloses 
underlying earnings greater than statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. Big4j,t equals 1 if j firm is audited by 
Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. Litigationj,t equals 1 if j firm is in pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or 
services industries, and 0 otherwise. Meetj,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s earnings before tax in year 
t is greater than or equal to earnings before tax in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Lossj,t  is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if j firm report statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise. MtoBj,t is the market-to-book equity ratio for firm j 
in year t. ROEj,t is earnings before tax divided by average equity for firm j in year t. Leveragej,t is measured by 
short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets for firm j, year t. SalesGj,t is  the sales for firm j, year t minus 
the sales for firm j, year t-1, then divided by  the sales for firm j, year t. MktCapj,t is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalisation of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j. Capitalj,t is capital intensity 





Variables definitions and measurements 
Variable  Proxy Measurement 
Dependent variables 
InAMj,t Income increasing earnings included in 
accrual-based earnings management  
Dummy variable, positive abnormal accruals 
are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
  
InExj,t 
Aggressive underlying earnings Dummy variable, underlying earnings greater 
than statutory earnings is coded as ‘1’and ‘0’ 
otherwise 
Independent variables H1 
Over1j,t Market-based equity is overvalued for 
one year, during the sample years 
Dummy variable, overvalued for one year, 
equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
Over2j,t Market-based equity is overvalued for 
two consecutive years, during the 
sample years 
Dummy variable, overvalued for two 
consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
Over3j,t Market-based equity is overvalued for 
three consecutive years, during the 
sample years 
Dummy variable, overvalued for three 
consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
Over4j,t Market-based equity is overvalued for 
four consecutive years, during the 
sample years 
Dummy variable, overvalued for four 
consecutive years, equals ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
Independent variable H2 
INDj,t 
Extent of independent directors on 
board  
Percent of independent directors over total 
directors of firm j in year t 
Control variables – accruals management specific  
Big4j,t 
Large four audit firms Dummy variable, 1 if j firm is audited by Big 4 
auditors, 0 otherwise 
Litigationj,t 
The risk of security litigation Dummy variable, 1 if j firm is in 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, software, or 
services industries, 0 otherwise 
Control variables – underlying earnings specific 
Meetj,t 
Meeting earnings targets Dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm’s 
earnings before tax in year t is greater than or 















Lossj,t   
Earnings loss situation Dummy variable that equals 1 if j firm reports 
statutory earnings in year t, and 0 otherwise 
Control variables – general 
PEj,t The growth potential of the firm Price-to-earnings ratio for j firm in year t 
PBj,t 
The extent of over- or under-valuation 
of stock price  
Price-to-book ratio for j firm in year t 
PBPEj,t 
Average of price-to-earnings ratio and 
price-to-book ratio  
The average of PEj,t and PBj,t for firm j in year 
t 
Leveragej,t 
Ability to meet financial obligations Short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets for firm j in year t 
SalesGj,t 
Sales growth  Sales for firm j, year t minus the sales for firm 
j, year t-1, then divided by the sales for firm j, 
in year t 
MtoBj,t Firm growth Market-to-book equity ratio for firm j, in year t 
Mktcapj,t 
A market-based firm size Natural logarithm of the market capitalisation 
of the firm at the beginning of year t for firm j 
NOAj,t 
The extent of earnings management in 
previous periods using accruals  
Shareholders’ equity less cash and cash 
equivalent plus total debt at the beginning of 
the year divided by lagged sales for firm j 
ROEj,t 
Profitability of firm Earnings before tax divided by average equity 
for firm j in year t 
Capitalj,t 
Ability to use assets to generate 
revenue 
Capital intensity measured by the ratio of net 
book value of property, plant, and equipment 
to total assets for firm j in year t 
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Appendix two 
Examples of firms that conform to/ do not conform to the underlying earnings 
disclosure guidelines12  
Firms that conform to guidelines  Firms that do not conform to guidelines 
Rio Tinto Limited 
 
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 








Mineral Resources Limited 
 
Beach Energy Limited 
 
Sigma Healthcare Limited 
 

















12	The annual reports were collected from DatAnalysis Premium database.	
